We study the repeated implementation of social choice functions in environments with complete information and changing preferences. We define dynamic monotonicity, a natural but nontrivial dynamic extension of Maskin monotonicity, and show that it is necessary and almost sufficient for repeated Nash implementation, regardless of whether the horizon is finite or infinite and whether the discount factor is "large" or "small."
Introduction
Many economic and social interactions are repeated: the same buyers and sellers often trade with one another multiple times, teams of contractors regularly work for the same procurement agencies, and voters repeatedly elect representatives, to name just a few. The central theme of this paper is the design of institutions, or contractual arrangements, that generate "socially desirable" outcomes in settings where agents repeatedly interact and preferences change over time.
To illustrate the type of economic problems this paper addresses, consider for example the situation in which a buyer and a seller interact more than once. Are there contractual arrangements that (in all equilibria) allow the seller to extract all the surplus from trade? As another example, consider the case in which two (or more) agents may work on a number of tasks that are profitable to a principal. Can we design arrangements that (again, in all equilibria) induce the agents to work on the most profitable tasks at each point in time, even if it is costly to them? In all these problems, an essential difficulty is the multiplicity of equilibria, including "undesirable" equilibria, that repeated interactions make possible to sustain. The aim of the paper is to characterize the social outcomes that are implementable; that is, those outcomes for which there exist contractual arrangements that only yield equilibria consistent with them.
More formally, we study the problem of repeated, full implementation of social choice functions in environments with complete information and a changing state of the world. A social choice function is repeatedly implementable in Nash equilibrium if there exists a sequence of (possibly history-dependent) mechanisms such that for any period, for any profile of preferences at that period, the set of equilibrium outcomes corresponds to the social choice function at that profile of preferences.
Full implementation in a static environment (i.e., with a single period) has been extensively studied. 1 The seminal contribution is Maskin (1999) , which states that Maskin monotonicity is necessary and almost sufficient for full implementation. In this paper, we provide a condition, called dynamic monotonicity, and show that it is necessary and almost sufficient for repeated Nash implementation, regardless of whether the horizon is finite or infinite and whether the discount factor is "large" or "small."
Dynamic monotonicity is a natural but nontrivial dynamic extension of Maskin monotonicity. It reduces to Maskin monotonicity in single-period settings, but is weaker in all other finitely repeated implementation problems. Thus, perhaps surprisingly, finitely repeated implementation is "easier" to achieve than single-shot implementation. For example, while full-surplus extraction by a seller cannot be implemented in a static problem, it can be if there are at least two periods in which the buyer and the seller interact (see Example 1 in Section 3).
We also show that in infinitely repeated problems with patient enough agents, dynamic monotonicity implies that the social choice function is weakly efficient from the agents' point of view. However, no efficiency condition is necessary in infinitely repeated problems with impatient enough agents and in all finitely repeated problems. For example, collusion among agents in a team can be deterred in all finite horizon problems and in infinite horizon problems with impatient enough agents (see Example 2 in Section 3).
In a repeated implementation problem, the designer's choice of a mechanism in each period may depend on the agents' actions and mechanisms in all previous periods; agents need not be playing the same stage game in each period. Intuitively, contractual arrangements may be used to compensate an agent when he deviates before period t from a collusive strategy profile that would induce socially undesirable outcomes from period t onward. This possibility of inducing preemptive deviations from future collusion facilitates implementation and is the reason why finitely repeated implementation is easier than static implementation. Indeed, it is only when the horizon is infinite and the discount factor is close to 1 that the gain from a future collusive agreement dominates any preemptive punishment and only outcomes that are efficient for the agents can be implemented. This insight is at the heart of Lee and Sabourian's (2011) work on infinitely repeated implementation problems (to be discussed shortly).
Unlike the literature on dynamic mechanism design, which has recently seen a flurry of papers (e.g., see the survey by Bergemann and Said 2011) , the literature on full implementation in dynamic environments is in its infancy. Two papers have studied repeated setting where, unlike in this paper, the state of the world does not change over time. Kalai and Ledyard (1998) study infinitely repeated implementation in dominant strategies; they show that every social choice function can be repeatedly implemented starting from some (possibly distant) point in the future. Chambers (2004) studies virtual repeated Nash implementation in continuous time.
In an important recent paper, Lee and Sabourian (2011) consider environments in which, like in our paper, the state of the world changes over time. 2 Unlike us, they focus on infinitely repeated settings with patient agents; that is, agents with a discount factor arbitrarily close to 1. Their main result is that weak efficiency of the social choice function relative to any other function with an equal or smaller range is necessary for infinitely repeated implementation. Under some mild additional assumptions on the environment, they also show that if the discount factor is larger than 1/2, then strict efficiency in the range is sufficient for infinitely repeated implementation from period two onward (but the designer may fail to implement the correct outcome in the first period).
Maskin monotonicity and weak efficiency in the range are very different conditions, and thus it is perhaps a puzzle that the first is necessary and almost sufficient in the static case and the second is necessary and almost sufficient in the polar case of infinite interactions with patient enough agents. In this paper, we solve this puzzle by introducing the condition of dynamic monotonicity and showing that it is necessary and almost sufficient in all repeated implementation problems, including the so-far unexplored, but clearly empirically important, case of a finite number of interactions and the case of infinitely repeated interactions with general discount factors. In the static case, dynamic monotonicity is equivalent to Maskin monotonicity. In infinitely repeated problems with an arbitrarily high enough discount factor, dynamic monotonicity is essentially equivalent to weak efficiency in the range. As we illustrate in Examples 1 and 2, neither Maskin monotonicity nor an efficiency condition are necessary for repeated implementation in general.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines the problem of repeated implementation. Section 3 presents two examples motivating our investigation. Section 4 introduces the condition of dynamic monotonicity. Section 5 presents the main results of the paper. Section 6 provides some extensions of our results and Section 7 concludes. All proofs are given in the Appendix.
Definitions
Single-shot implementation. A static or single-shot implementation problem P is a tuple I X (u i ) i∈I , where I = {1 I} is a set of I agents, X is the set of alternativesa compact subset of a finite dimensional Euclidean space, is a finite set of states of the world, and for each agent i ∈ I, u i : X × → R is a state-dependent continuous utility function. Let L i (x θ) = {y ∈ X : u i (x θ) ≥ u i (y θ)} be agent i's lower contour set of x at state θ. A social choice function (henceforth, scf ) f : → X associates with each state of the world θ the alternative f (θ) ∈ X.
2 See also Renou and Tomala (2015) and Lee and Sabourian (2013) for the problem of approximate implementation in environments with incomplete information.
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set of (pure) Nash equilibrium outcomes of the game G(θ). The social choice function f is single-shot implementable in Nash equilibrium if there exists a static mechanism G such that NE G (θ) = {f (θ)} for all θ ∈ .
A necessary and almost sufficient condition for static Nash implementation is Maskin monotonicity. In Definition 1, we present two equivalent, slightly unusual, formulations of Maskin monotonicity, as they foreshadow and will help understanding our definition of dynamic monotonicity. Call any map π : → a (static) deception and let 1 be the set of static deceptions. The interpretation is that when the state is θ, agents act as if the state were π(θ) instead.
Definition 1. A social choice function f is Maskin monotonic when it satisfies (M A ) or, equivalently, (M B ).
The intuition for the necessity of Maskin monotonicity is simple. Suppose that f is implementable and let π be a deception. At state π(θ), there must exist an equilibrium m * that implements f (π(θ)). However, if f (π(θ)) = f (θ), m * should not be an equilibrium at state θ, so that at least one agent must have a profitable deviation; that is, he must have a unilateral deviation from m * that induces an alternative x strictly preferred to f (π(θ)) at state θ. And since m * is an equilibrium at state π(θ), the deviation cannot be profitable at π(θ); that is, f (π(θ)) is preferred to x at state π(θ). Condition (M B ) precisely captures this intuition.
Repeated implementation. A repeated implementation problem, denoted P T , represents the T -time repetition of the implementation problem P; T can be finite or infinite. At the beginning of each period t ∈ T = {1 T }, the state of the world is drawn from with probability mass function p, with p(θ) > 0 for all θ ∈ . In each period, the realized state is commonly observed by all agents, but not the designer.
Let (x(t θ)) t∈T θ∈ be a sequence of alternatives, where x(t θ) is the alternative implemented in state θ at period t. An agent's expected payoff over sequences of alternatives is given by the discounted criterion; that is, there exists δ ∈ (0 1) such that the Theoretical Economics 12 (2017) Repeated Nash implementation 253 payoff of agent i from (x(t θ)) t∈T θ∈ is given by 3
The aim of the designer is to repeatedly implement a social choice function f . A dynamic mechanism regime specifies a mechanism in each period t, contingent on the profile of mechanisms offered and messages played up to period t (excluding period t). A designer history h t D is a sequence of mechanisms and corresponding messages (G 1 m 1 G τ m τ G t−1 m t−1 ) such that G τ is the mechanism adopted at period τ and m τ ∈ M G τ is the corresponding message profile, for all τ < t. The set of all possible histories observed by the designer at period t is denoted H t D . The set of initial histories H 1 D is the singleton {∅} and the set of all possible designer histories is
A dynamic mechanism regime, or regime for short, specifies a lottery over static mechanisms as a function of the designer history. We write r(G; h t D ) for the probability that mechanism G is chosen after history h t D . 4 We assume perfect monitoring. 5 At the beginning of period t, each agent knows the entire profile of mechanisms chosen up to period t − 1, the entire profile of messages sent up to period t − 1, the entire profile of states of the world realized up to period t − 1, and the period t's mechanism selected as well as the realized state of the world for period t. Write θ t = (θ 1 θ t−1 ) for a profile of realized states of the world up to period t − 1. A history for agent i is thus h t = (h t D θ t ). Let H t be the set of all possible t-period agent histories and ket H = T t=1 H t be the set of all such histories. The only possible initial history is the empty set: H 1 = {∅}.
A pure strategy s i for agent i specifies a message in each period t as a function of the history h t , the mechanism G t currently selected, and the current state θ t ; that is, s i (h t G t θ t ) ∈ M G t i for all (h t G t θ t ). Let s = (s 1 s I ) be a strategy profile. The strategy profile s, the random draw of a state in each period, and the regime r generate a random sequence of histories h t .
Given a regime r, we write q(h t ; s) for the probability that history h t occurs when the strategy profile is s. Throughout, we slightly abuse notation and write r(G t ; h t ) for r(G t ; h t D ) for any h t = (h t D θ t ). The expected payoff of agent i when the profile of strategies is s is
3 When computing payoffs starting from any period t, we use the normalizing factor (1 − δ)/(1 − δ T −t+1 ), so that the discounted payoff from t is measured on the same scale as the single-shot payoff. 4 We assume that, for each h t D , r(·; h t D ) has finite support. 5 In other words, we assume that the designer truthfully and publicly reveals all his information (i.e., messages received, alternative implemented, and mechanism selected) at each period. In a more general model, the communication policy would also be part of the design problem, i.e., the designer would also choose how much to reveal to the agents in each period. Clearly, this can only enlarge the set of implementable social choice functions.
254 Mezzetti and Renou Theoretical Economics 12 (2017) A profile of pure strategies s * = (s * i s * −i ) is a pure Nash equilibrium of the dynamic game induced by regime r if U i (s * ) ≥ U i (s i s * −i ) for all strategies s i , for all agents i ∈ I (where s * −i denotes the strategy profile of agent i's opponents).
Definition 2. A social choice function f is repeatedly implementable if there exists a dynamic mechanism regime r such that (i) there exists a Nash equilibrium s * of the dynamic game induced by r and (ii) for each Nash equilibrium s induced by r, we have g(s(h t G t θ t )) = f (θ t ) for all θ t ∈ , for all (h t G t ) such that q(h t ; s) > 0, and r(G t ; h t ) > 0, for all t ∈ T .
Intuitively, a social choice function is repeatedly implementable if we can construct a dynamic mechanism whose unique equilibrium outcome is f (θ) in all periods where the state is θ. As is customary in the literature, Definition 2 does not rule out mixed strategy equilibria with outcome realizations different from f (θ). In Section 6 we will show that it is possible to rule out such undesirable mixed strategy equilibria.
We end this section with three notions of efficiency of an scf. The expected payoff of agent i when f is repeatedly implemented is v Example 1 (Trading a Good). This is a multiperiod variation of the leading example of Aghion et al. (2012) .
There are two periods, t = 1 2, a buyer B, and a seller S. In each period, the seller has a good for sale; the quality θ of the good is independently drawn in each period and equally likely to be θ L = 10 or θ H = 14. The buyer and the seller have a common discount factor δ and observe the good's quality at the beginning of each period.
As in Aghion et al., payments to and from a third party are allowed. Hence, the set of outcomes X is the set of triplets (z p B p S ) with z ∈ {0 1} representing whether the good is traded (z = 1) or not (z = 0), p B ∈ P representing the price paid by the buyer, and p S ∈ P representing the price paid to the seller, where P is a (arbitrarily large) closed interval in R. For any outcome (z p B p S ), the (per-period) buyer's utility is when the good quality is θ, with u(0) = 0 and u a strictly increasing, strictly concave function. The seller's utility is p S . We want to implement the efficient allocation prescribing that in each period the good is traded and the buyer pays the seller the true quality, p B = p S = θ; that is, the scf we want to implement is f (θ L ) = (1 10 10) and f (θ H ) = (1 14 14). 7 Since f is not Maskin monotonic, it cannot be implemented in Nash equilibrium in a static setting. 8 We now present a simple dynamic mechanism that repeatedly implements f in Nash equilibrium. In the first period, the buyer and the seller report a message in {θ L Nθ L Nθ H θ H }. We interpret the report θ k as stating that "the quality is θ k ." The reports Nθ k are objections that lead to different first-period allocations and secondperiod mechanisms than announcing either θ H or θ L . In the second period, the buyer and the seller have the opportunity to make an additional report in {θ L θ H } if and only if they have reported the same quality in the first period. In all other cases, the secondperiod allocation is chosen without requiring buyer and seller to make reports. Table 1 gives the allocation rule in the first period along with the regime. Table 1 has 16 cells, one for each possible report profile in the first period; the row (resp., column) report is the buyer (resp., seller) report. Each cell has two elements. The top element gives the first-period allocation, while the bottom element (indicated with the symbol →) gives the transition to the second-period mechanism. For instance, if the buyer reports θ L and the seller reports Nθ L , the first-period allocation is (1 10 10), while the second-period mechanism implements (1 11 11) and requires no secondperiod reports. When the buyer and the seller report the same quality in the first period, the second-period mechanism is G 2 , given in Table 2 : 9 7 Note that if u (0) = 1, then this allocation also maximizes total surplus. 8 Formally, we have that
we have a violation of Maskin monotonicity. 9 On the equilibrium path, mechanism G 2 guarantees that trade takes place in the second period and the expected price is 12 for both the buyer and the seller.
256 Mezzetti and Renou Theoretical Economics 12 (2017) We claim that whenever y is chosen so that −u(−4) > δu(y) > u(4), the unique pure strategy equilibrium implements the efficient allocation in both periods. 10 This is verified in the Appendix, which presents the two reduced strategic-form games that are obtained by conditioning on the first-period quality. 11 A notable feature of our mechanism is that it provides at least one agent with the incentive to deviate early (at t = 1) from future (at t = 2) coordination on undesirable equilibria (coordinating on announcing θ L when the good's quality is θ H ). It is precisely the ability to provide such incentives in a dynamic setting that allows the repeated Nash implementation of social choice functions, like the one in this example, that are not implementable in a static setting. ♦ Example 2 (Task assignment). In each of a possibly infinite number of periods, a principal needs to assign two agents (experts), 1 and 2, to one of two tasks, A and B. There are two states of the world, θ ∈ {θ A θ B }. The agents know the state of the world, but not the principal. In state θ A (resp., θ B ), task A (resp., B) yields the principal a benefit v greater than the cost to undertake it, while the other task yields zero benefit and cost. An allocation is a quadruplet (a 1 a 2 w 1 w 2 ), with a i ∈ {A B} the assignment of agent i ∈ {1 2} and w i ≥ 0 his wage. When the state is θ, the assignment is (a i a −i ), and the wage is w i , agent i's payoff is w i − c i (a i a −i θ), where c i (a i a −i θ) is agent i's cost of executing task a i when the other agent is assigned to task a −i , at state θ. There are complementarities: the more agents work on a task, the less costly it is: c i (
, and the cost is zero otherwise; in addition, v is sufficiently large, e.g., v > 4, so that it is profitable for the principal to induce the agents to work on the right task. The principal wants to maximize his ex post profit in each period, subject to giving the agents at least their per-period outside option payoff, which we normalize to zero. This corresponds to the scfs f (θ A ) = (A A 1 1) and f (θ B ) = (B B 1 1). Note that f maximizes social surplus in each period and state.
The scf f is Maskin monotonic, but it is not efficient relative to social choice functions having (weakly) smaller ranges. For instance, the functions f * (θ A ) = (B B 1 1) and f * (θ B ) = (A A 1 1), with agents being paid to work on the unprofitable task, give a strictly higher expected utility to both agents than f . Thus, if the agents are sufficiently patient, then f cannot be repeatedly implemented in infinite horizon problems (Theorem 1, Lee and Sabourian 2011). At the end of Section 5 we will show that f is infinitely repeatedly implementable if the discount factor is not too large. We now argue that the f is repeatedly implementable in any finite horizon problem. Consider the static mechanism where each agent has two messages, θ A and θ B , and the allocation rule is represented as in Table 3; Table 4 displays the payoffs to each agent of each alternative in each state.
At state θ A , the mechanism induces a prisoner's dilemma, with (θ A θ A ) as the unique Nash equilibrium and equilibrium outcome (A A 1 1). Similarly, at state θ B , the mechanism induces a prisoner's dilemma, with (θ B θ B ) as the unique Nash equilibrium and equilibrium outcome (B B 1 1). So f is implementable when T = 1. More fundamentally, at states θ A and θ B , the unique equilibrium payoff coincides with the min-max payoff. Consequently, repeated play of the stage game equilibrium is the only Nash equilibrium of the finitely repeated game (e.g., see Benoît and Krishna, 1987, and González-Díaz 2006) , and by selecting the mechanism regime that uses the static mechanism in each round, f can be finitely repeatedly implemented in Nash equilibrium, regardless of the number of periods.
This shows that there is an important difference between what can be implemented in finitely repeated problems and what can be implemented in infinitely repeated problems with an arbitrarily large discount factor, as studied by Lee and Sabourian (2011) . ♦
Dynamic monotonicity
Consider any period t and any sequence (u τ i ) τ≥t of payoffs from period t onward. We can write agent i's discounted payoff at period t as
258 Mezzetti and Renou Theoretical Economics 12 (2017) where v i (t) is the (normalized) discounted continuation payoff and β t T is the (normalized) discount factor at period t: that is,
When the horizon is infinite, i.e., T = ∞, we have β t ∞ = δ. The lowest and highest expected payoff agent i can obtain are
The set V i (t) corresponds to the set of feasible agent i's (normalized) continuation payoffs at period t. Denote by v f i (t) the (normalized) expected discounted payoff of agent i when f is implemented from period t + 1 onward. Thus,
We now generalize the important concept of deception to the dynamic setting. At each period t, a deception specifies a stateθ t as a function of the realized state θ t and the history of realized states up to period t, θ t . Formally, a deception π is a sequence of maps (π t : t × → ) T t=1 . Intuitively, suppose that each agent is asked to directly report a state at each period (as in a direct mechanism). A deception then corresponds to a situation where the agents coordinate their reports toθ t = π t (θ t θ t ) at period t, when the current state is θ t and the profile of realized states is θ t . 12 (If reports are not coordinated, the designer detects a lie and can punish the agents.) Of course, the mechanism does not have to be direct. Nonetheless, the concept of a deception remains important: agents can play at period t and realized states θ t as if the current state is π t (θ t θ t ) and not θ t . A special deception is π * , given by π * t (θ t θ t ) = θ t for all (θ t θ t ), for all t. This corresponds to truth-telling. Let T be the set of deceptions.
We define the (normalized) expected discounted continuation payoff of agent i from following the deception π after state history (θ t θ t ) recursively as
This is agent i's discounted continuation payoff if, in all periods τ > t, the designer uses the social choice function f at the reported state π τ (θ τ θ τ ) to determine the period τ alternative. Note that the discounted continuation payoff v f π * i (θ t θ t ) from the truthtelling deception π * is equal to v f i (t), regardless of (θ t θ t ).
12 Note that π and the history of realized states θ t determine a unique history of reported states.
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For any history of realized states θ t and deception π, we define the dynamic lower contour set of x at θ t as
Dynamic lower contour sets are defined in the space of alternatives and continuation payoffs. Intuitively, for any deception π and history of states θ t , the dynamic lower contour set at θ t is composed of all the pairs of alternatives and continuation payoffs that give agent i a smaller expected discounted payoff than when x is implemented at state θ t in period t and agents continue to follow the deception π from period t + 1 onward. Note that L f π * i θ t (x θ t ) does not depend on θ t , since the truth-telling deception π * does not. With a slight abuse of notation, we therefore write L f i t (x θ t ) for L f π * i θ t (x θ t ). We are now ready to present two equivalent definitions of dynamic monotonicity, the dynamic generalization of Maskin monotonicity.
Definition 3 (Dynamic monotonicity). A social choice function f is dynamic monotonic if it satisfies (DM A ) or, equivalently, (DM B ).
(1 − β t T ) u i f π t (θ t θ t ) π t (θ t θ t ) − u i x π t (θ t θ t )
Intuitively, dynamic monotonicity says that if agents coordinate on a deception that induces an undesirable alternative at some period t (for some profile of realized states), then at least one agent must have a profitable deviation starting at some time t. Since the problem is dynamic, the profitable deviation does not have to start at t ; it could start before or after; t need not equal t . For instance, in Example 1, the seller has a profitable deviation at the first period from the second-period coordination on trading the high quality good at the low price.
It is worth noting that we can restrict attention to deceptions that weakly dominate truth-telling in checking for dynamic monotonicity, i.e., to deceptions π such that v f π i (θ t θ t ) ≥ v f i for all i, for all (θ t θ t ), for all t.
260 Mezzetti and Renou Theoretical Economics 12 (2017) A few additional observations are worth making. First, for T = 1, dynamic monotonicity reduces to Maskin monotonicity. Second, observe that when T = ∞, β t T = δ for all t, and the dynamic lower contour sets do not vary with t. Consequently, when checking for dynamic monotonicity, it is sufficient to consider t = 1. Third, an easyto-check sufficient condition for dynamic monotonicity is as follows. For each agent i, define v max i = max π: → θ u i (f (π(θ)) θ)p(θ) as the highest payoff that agent i can obtain if all agents coordinate on the most favorable static deception π for agent i (v max i is also the highest payoff that agent i can obtain by maximizing over all dynamic deceptions). Suppose that f (θ) = f (θ * ). Using (DM B ), a sufficient condition for dynamic monotonicity is that for all deceptions such that π t (θ t θ * ) = θ for some θ t ∈ t and t ∈ T , there exist t ∈ T , i ∈ I, x ∈ X, and v i (t) ∈ V i (t) that satisfy
The example illustrating Remark 5 shows that this condition is easy to check. We end this section with a series of remarks. The message we want to convey is that dynamic monotonicity is the "general" condition for repeated Nash implementation. It reduces to Maskin monotonicity when there is a single period and essentially corresponds to Lee and Sabourian's (2011) efficiency in the range when there are an infinite number of periods and a discount factor close to 1.
The first remark gives another easy-to-check sufficient condition for the dynamic monotonicity of a social choice function. The second remark states that, in finite horizon problems, dynamic monotonicity is weaker than Maskin monotonicity. The converse is false; Example 1 demonstrates that dynamic monotonicity is strictly weaker than Maskin monotonicity. Remark 1. If the social choice function f is strictly efficient in the range and (v f i ) i∈I is an extreme point of co(V (f )), then f is dynamic monotonic whenever T ≥ 2.
Remark 2. Suppose T < ∞. If f is Maskin monotonic, then it is dynamic monotonic.
Remark 3. Suppose T = ∞. There exists δ H ∈ (0 1) such that for all δ ∈ (δ H 1), if f is dynamic monotonic, then it is weakly efficient in the range.
Remark 4. Suppose T = ∞. If f is Maskin monotonic and efficient in the range, then it is dynamic monotonic.
Remark 5. There are social choice functions, which are neither efficient nor Maskin monotonic, and yet are dynamically monotonic.
As a demonstration of Remark 5, suppose that there are two agents, two periods, no discounting (i.e., δ = 1), two equiprobable states of the world θ and θ , and five alternatives a, b, c, d, e. Let the payoffs be as in Table 5 . The social choice functions are f (θ) = a and f (θ ) = b, and the associated payoff profile is (v
for all i, and yet f (θ ) = f (θ). It is also not efficient in the range since if players coordinate on θ (resp., θ ) when the state is θ (resp., θ), then they each obtain a payoff of 7/2. Yet, f is dynamic monotonic. To see this, remember that v max i is the highest payoff that agent i can obtain if all agents coordinate on the most favorable deception for agent i, and note that v max 1 = 9/2, while v max 2 = 5. It is immediate to check that the pair (d 10) satisfies
Similarly, the pair (e 10) satisfies u 2 f (θ ) θ + v f 2 = 3 + 3 ≥ −10 + 10 = u 2 (e θ ) + v 2 max u 2 f (θ ) θ u 2 f (θ) θ + v max 2 = 3 + 5 < 0 + 10 = u 1 (e θ) + v 2
We have the necessary preference reversals in the first period and, therefore, the social choice function is dynamic monotonic.
The final remark states that in finitely repeated settings the set of social choice functions that are dynamic monotonic is weakly increasing in T .
Remark 6. Suppose T < ∞ and f is dynamic monotonic over T periods. Then f is also dynamic monotonic over T + 1 periods. 13 
Main results
This section presents our main results, stating that dynamic monotonicity is necessary and almost sufficient for repeated Nash implementation. We begin with necessity.
Theorem 1 (Necessity). If the social choice function f is repeatedly implementable, then it is dynamic monotonic.
The intuition for Theorem 1 is simple and analogous to the intuition for the necessity of Maskin monotonicity in static implementation problems. If the social choice function f is implementable, there must exist a mechanism and an equilibrium such that f (θ t ) is implemented at period t and state θ t , and the continuation payoff to any agent i is v f i (t), for any t ∈ T . Moreover, for any realized profile of states θ t , all deviations at period t and state θ t must give to agent i an alternative x and a continuation payoff v i in L f i θ t (f (θ t ) θ t ). Consider a deception π and a "collusive" equilibrium in which agents follow the deception (on the equilibrium path) and revert to the original equilibrium after unilateral deviations. In particular, agents pretend that the state is π t (θ t θ * t ) = θ t when the realized state at period t is θ * t and the history of realized states up to period t is θ t . As a result, f (θ t ) = f (π t (θ t θ * t )) is implemented at t in state θ * t , and the expected payoff of agent i is
, then agent i has no profitable deviation from the collusive equilibrium. For otherwise, he would have had a profitable deviation at state θ t from the original equilibrium. Hence, for f to be implemented, it must be that f (θ * t ) = f (θ t ); that is, f must be dynamic monotonic.
We now consider sufficient conditions. As in static implementation problems, we distinguish between the case of two and more than two agents. We need to introduce some additional definitions.
For each Y ⊆ X, define max
for all y ∈ Y } as agent i's maximal set in Y at state θ. A social choice function f satisfies no-veto power if, for all θ ∈ , x ∈ max θ i X for all i ∈ I * with |I * | ≥ I − 1 implies f (θ) = x. Maskin monotonicity and no-veto power are sufficient for static Nash implementation when there are at least three agents. A similar results holds in the repeated setting once we replace Maskin monotonicity with dynamic monotonicity.
Theorem 2 (Sufficiency I ≥ 3). Let I ≥ 3. If the social choice function f is dynamic monotonic and satisfies no-veto power, then it is repeatedly implementable.
The proof is constructive. The main building block of our construction is the static mechanism G * , a close relative to Maskin's (1999) canonical mechanism. The mechanism G * requires the agents to report a state, an alternative, a continuation payoff, and an integer. At period t, "unanimous" reports (θ t f (θ t ) v f i (t) 0) result in the realization of f (θ t ) and in the adoption of G * in the next period. A unilateral deviation from unanimity by agent j at t, (θ j t x j t v j t n j t ), results in the realization of x j t at t and in the continuation payoff v j t thereafter, if (x j t v j t ) is in agent j's dynamic contour set L f j t (f (θ t ) θ t ) (where θ t is the common state report of all agents but agent j). Alternatively, the deviation results in the realization of f (θ t ) at period t and in the continuation payoff v f j (t) thereafter. To guarantee that agent j obtains v j t (or v f j (t)) in the future, the regime appropriately randomizes between adopting a mechanism where agent j is dictatorial (i.e., chooses the alternative), which would guarantee he receives v j , and a punishment mechanism where agent j would get less than v j t (or v f j (t)). Any other report profile at t leads to the agent reporting the highest integer at t being dictatorial at t and in all future periods. Notice that the mechanism G * is equivalent to Maskin's canonical mechanism when T = 1, and indeed guarantees the implementation of f for very similar arguments as in Maskin (1999) . As the canonical Maskin mechanism with T = 1, our mechanism regime does not rule out undesirable mixed strategy equilibria. As we discuss in Section 6, under a mild additional assumption we can eliminate them. 14 The dynamic mechanism regime we construct only uses stage mechanisms that are deterministic functions of the agents' messages, but permits random transitions between these mechanisms. Without making further assumptions, it seems impossible to prove Theorem 2 without the help of stochastic transitions or, alternatively, stochastic stage mechanisms. 15 Yet, in environments with transfers and quasi-linear preferences, there is no need for stochastic transitions; we can always adjust the transfers to guarantee that the agent obtains the appropriate continuation payoff.
As Maskin's (1999) theorem for static Nash implementation, Theorem 2 requires noveto power. We can weaken the no-veto power requirement. For instance, Theorem 2 remains valid if we replace no-veto power with Assumption A, stated below, which is closely related to the conditions μ(ii) and μ(iii) of Moore and Repullo. 16 We first need some additional notation. Let ϕ t : {t + 1 T } × → X be a time-dependent social choice function and write v ϕ t i the continuation payoff of implementing ϕ t from period t + 1 onward, that is,
We are now ready to state Assumption A.
Assumption A. A social choice function f satisfies Assumption A if the following statements hold:
(i) For all (x v i (t)) ∈ L i t (f (θ) θ) with i ∈ I, θ ∈ and t ∈ T and for all pairs (ϕ t ϕ t ) such that (a1) either λ(v i (t)) = 0 or ϕ t (τ θ) ∈ j max θ j X for all θ ∈ , for all τ > t 17
(a2) ϕ t (τ θ) ∈ j =i max θ j X for all θ ∈ , for all τ > t
we have that x = f (θ * ), and ϕ t (τ ·) = ϕ t (τ ·) = f for all τ > t.
(ii) For all x such that x ∈ j max θ * j X, we have that x = f (θ * ).
14 See Mezzetti and Renou (2012) for an alternative definition of static implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium.
15Ā zacis and Vida (2015) use random mechanisms and random transitions in their analysis of infinitely repeated implementation problems. 16 We prove this and the following claim in footnotes 22 and 23. 17 We thank Helmuts Azacis and Peter Vida for pointing out the need to add λ(v i (t)) = 0 as a special case.
264 Mezzetti and Renou Theoretical Economics 12 (2017) Condition (i) is similar to condition μ(ii) of Moore and Repullo. It states that if x maximizes the payoff of all agents but agent i at state θ * , if ϕ t maximizes the continuation payoff of all agents while ϕ t maximize the continuation payoff of all agents but agent i, and if the pair (x λ(v i (t))v
is maximal in the dynamic lower contour set L i t (f (θ) θ) at state θ * , then not only alternative x must coincide with f (θ * ) at state θ * , but also ϕ t (τ ·) and ϕ t (τ ·) must coincide with f for all τ > t. Note that condition (i) is weaker than no-veto power and is almost identical to condition μ(ii) at period T , when T < ∞. Condition (ii) is a unanimity condition.
We now consider the two-agent case. As shown by Dutta and Sen (1991) and Moore and Repullo (1988) , for the static case with two agents, self-selection is a necessary condition for Nash implementation. 18 Our sufficiency result for two agents requires a strengthening of self-selection. 19 Assumption B. There exists an alternative w such that u i (w θ) < u i (f (θ ) θ) for all (θ θ) ∈ × , for all i ∈ {1 2}. Assumption B requires that there exists a bad outcome (relative to f ) for both agents. For instance, in pure exchange economies with strictly monotone preferences, the zero consumption bundle is a bad outcome relative to any social choice function that gives positive consumption to each consumer in at least one state of the world. Other examples satisfying Assumption B include environments with transferable utilities, like our two examples in Section 3. We have the following theorem.
Theorem 3 (Sufficiency I = 2). Let I = 2. Suppose Assumptions A and B hold. If a social choice function f is dynamic monotonic, then it is repeatedly implementable.
We now briefly return to Examples 1 and 2.
Example 1 (revisited). The set V (f ) of expected (ex ante) payoff vectors that the two parties would obtain with an scf whose range is a subset of {(1 10 10) (1 14 14)}, the range of f , is {(u(4)/2 10) (0 12) ((u(−4) + u(4))/2 12) (u(−4)/2 14)}. Thus f , which yields expected payoffs (v f B v f S ) = (0 12), is strictly efficient and an extreme point in the convex hull of V (f ). By Remark 1, f is dynamic monotonic. Since Assumptions A and B hold, f is repeatedly implementable in Nash equilibrium irrespective of the discount factor, as long as there are at least two periods. ♦ Example 2 (revisited). Consider an infinitely repeated setting. To show under which condition f is dynamic monotonic when T = ∞, we can use the sufficient condition provided after Definition 3. Observe that v f i = 0 for all i ∈ I and that the best possible collusive deception is π t (θ t θ A ) = θ B and π t (θ t θ B ) = θ A for all θ t , for all t ∈ T . Under such a deception, v .) Given the 18 In Proposition 1 in the Appendix, we show that a weaker condition, dynamic self-selection, is necessary for repeated Nash implementation.
19 Self-selection: Let I = 2. There exists
symmetry of the setup, we only need to consider the pairs (θ A θ B ) with π t (θ t θ B ) = θ A . Since f (θ B ) = f (θ A ), dynamic monotonicity (DM B ) requires that there exist i ∈ I, x ∈ X, and v i ∈ V i (t) such that
This is equivalent to
By symmetry, we may take i to be any agent, say agent 1. The only alternatives x that may satisfy (1) for agent 1 assign agent 1 to task A and agent 2 to task B. Letting x = (A B w 1 w 2 ), (1) becomes (1 − δ)(3 − w 1 ) ≥ δv i > 1 − (1 − δ)w 1 , which holds if and only if δ < 2/3. This shows that f satisfies dynamic monotonicity if the discount factor is less than 2/3. Thus, dynamic monotonicity does not imply weak efficiency in infinite horizon problems when the discount factor is not too large. Since the setting of the example satisfies Assumptions A and B, with an infinite time horizon, f can be repeatedly implemented, and collusion among the agents avoided, as long as δ < 2/3. ♦
Discussion
This section discusses some important aspect of our analysis. Mixed strategies. The proof of Theorem 2 does not rule out undesirable mixed strategy equilibria. We now show that the theorem extends to mixed strategies under the mild additional assumption of no indifference, which states that no agent is totally indifferent between all alternatives at all states.
We say that a scf f is repeatedly implementable in mixed Nash equilibrium if it it is repeatedly implementable in Nash equilibrium and, in addition, there are no mixed strategy Nash equilibria that yield in some period t an outcome y / ∈ f (θ) with positive probability, when the state is θ.
Theorem 4. Let I ≥ 3. Assume no indifference holds. If the social choice function f is dynamic monotonic and satisfies no-veto power, then it is repeatedly implementable in mixed Nash equilibrium.
Two obstacles must be overcome when dealing with mixing by agents. First, the best message for an agent to send depends on the messages sent by the other agents, but the agent has no certainty over such messages when the other agents mix. For instance, announcing a large integer so as to become a dictator entails the risk of being the odd man out when others play unanimously. Second, we need to consider distributions over deceptions so as to account for mixed strategies, i.e., distributions over pure strategies. In the proof, we overcome these difficulties by introducing random stage mechanisms. This guarantees that mixing only occurs in the last period in all equilibria (if there is a last period). Moreover, the last-period mechanism is a version of the mechanism in 266 Mezzetti and Renou Theoretical Economics 12 (2017) Maskin and Sjöström (2002) , which allows agents to propose alternatives contingent on the state report of their opponents. This guarantees that no undesirable equilibria exist.
Subgame perfection. The solution concept adopted in this paper is Nash equilibrium. All our results extend straightforwardly to subgame perfection. First, it is easy to check that the Nash equilibrium s E constructed in the proof of Theorem 2 (and Theorem 3) is subgame perfect. Since there are no undesirable Nash equilibria, hence no undesirable subgame-perfect Nash equilibria, this implies that dynamic monotonicity together with no-veto power (or Assumption A) are sufficient for subgame-perfect implementation. Dynamic monotonicity is also necessary as long as the mechanism adopted in each period is a static mechanism. To see this, suppose that f is repeatedly implementable in subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium, and let s be an implementing equilibrium. Assume that there exists a deception π such that for all t ∈ T , for all θ t ∈ t , for all pairs (θ t θ * t ) with π t (θ t θ
As in the proof of Theorem 1, we can construct a Nash equilibrium s that implements f (π t (θ t ·)) at all periods t and at all profiles θ t of realized states up to period t. Moreover, off the equilibrium path, s agrees with s, so that s is also a subgame-perfect equilibrium and hence f must be dynamic monotonic. 20 Time-dependent social choice functions. We have assumed that the designer wants to implement the same social choice function f in each period. A more general objective would be to implement a sequence (f t ) t∈T of social choice functions. It is straightforward to modify the definitions of continuation payoffs, dynamic lower contour sets, and dynamic monotonicity to account for time-dependent social choice functions. With these modifications, dynamic monotonicity remains necessary and almost sufficient for repeated Nash implementation.
Social choice correspondences. The analysis extends to the implementation of social choice correspondences. Let F : → 2 X \ {∅} be a social choice correspondence; denote by F the set of all possible social choice functions that are selections of F . A social choice correspondence is implementable if there exists a dynamic mechanism such that for every selection f ∈ F, there exists a Nash equilibrium that repeatedly implements f , and every Nash equilibrium repeatedly implements a selection f ∈ F. A social choice correspondence F is dynamic monotonic when it satisfies the following criterion:
Note that the concept of dynamic monotonicity (for correspondences) is equivalent to Maskin monotonicity (for correspondences) in static implementation problems, and clearly equivalent to Definition 3 when F is single-valued. To see the necessity of 20 It is important to stress that the restriction to static mechanisms within a period rules out the mechanisms used by Moore and Repullo (1988) and Abreu and Sen (1990) to show that, in single-shot environments, subgame-perfect implementation is substantially more permissive than Nash implementation. the modified condition of dynamic monotonicity, suppose that F is repeatedly implementable and assume that there exist a selection f ∈ F, a deception π such that for all t ∈ T , for all θ t ∈ t , for all pairs (θ t θ * t ) with π t (θ t θ
As in the proof of Theorem 1, we can construct an equilibrium that implements f (π t (θ t ·)) at all periods t and at all profiles θ t of realized states up to period t. Consequently, there must exist f * ∈ F such that f (π t (θ t ·)) = f * for all θ t ∈ t , for all t ∈ T , i.e., F must be dynamic monotonic. To show sufficiency, we need to augment the dynamic mechanism regime in the proof of Theorem 2 with an initial stage (period t = 0) in which all agents announce a selection f ∈ F. If all agents announce the same selection f ∈ F at period t = 0, then our dynamic mechanism regime takes effect from t = 1 with f the social choice function adopted in the canonical mechanism G * t . If not all agents make the same announcement at t = 0, then our dynamic mechanism regime takes effect from t = 1 with an arbitrary f * ∈ F as the social choice function adopted in G * t .
Conclusions
Our main contribution is to introduce the condition of dynamic monotonicity, a natural but nontrivial dynamic extension of Maskin monotonicity, and to show, in Theorems 1-4, that dynamic monotonicity is necessary and almost sufficient for repeated Nash implementation of social choice functions, regardless of whether the horizon is finite or infinite and whether the discount factor is large or small. 21 Many economic applications of implementation theory, for example most of the contracting literature (e.g., see Aghion et al., 2012 or Maskin and Tirole 1999) , focus on static problems. One of the main insights of our paper is that the (finitely) repeated implementation of desirable social choice functions is easier than static implementation, as last-period, or late periods, planned deviations from truth-telling can be avoided by rewarding defection in early periods. For instance, we can implement full surplus extraction by a seller as long as there are at least two periods, while full surplus extraction is not implementable in static problems (see Example 1).
Appendix
This appendix contains the proofs of all our results and the reduced strategic-form games associated with Example 1.
Example 1 (The strategic-form games). Conditional on a realized first-period quality, the buyer and the seller have 64 strategies each. An agent is active at the initial history as well as at the histories (θ H θ H ) and (θ L θ L ). At the initial history, the agent has four actions. At histories (θ H θ H ) and (θ L θ L ), an agent has two actions for each realization of the second-period quality. All strategies where an agent plays Nθ L in the first period 21 Indeed, Theorem 1 also remains true if we adopt a different criterion than the discounting criterion to evaluate streams of payoff, e.g., the overtaking criterion or the limit of the means criterion (naturally, with a modification in the definition of dynamic monotonicity to account for these changes).
268 Mezzetti and Renou Theoretical Economics 12 (2017) are payoff equivalent (there are 16 strategies of that form), and similarly, for all strategies where an agent plays Nθ H in the first period. We write Nθ L and Nθ H for those strategies. If the first-period reports do not match, then the game essentially ends. Thus, all strategies where an agent reports θ L at the initial history, reports θ L at the history (θ L θ L ) conditional on second-period quality θ L , and reports θ L at the history (θ L θ L ) conditional on second-period quality θ H are payoff-equivalent. We write θ L θ L θ L for those strategies. Similarly, for all other strategies. For instance, θ H θ H θ L represents all strategies where an agent reports θ H at the initial history, reports θ H at the history (θ H θ H ) conditional on second-period quality θ L , and reports θ L at the history (θ H θ H ) conditional on second-period quality θ H . Each reduced strategic-form game has therefore 10 "strategies." Tables 6 and 7 represent the two reduced strategic-form games associated with each first-period quality θ L and θ H . The buyer is the row player, while the seller is the column player. In each cell, the top payoff is the buyer's payoff, while the bottom payoff is the seller's payoff. ♦
Throughout the proofs, we use the following observation. For any deceptionπ ∈ T and state historyθ T ∈ T such that for all
The deception π agrees withπ atθ T and with π * at all other state histories. Thus, if f is dynamic monotonic, then f (π t (θ t θ t )) = f (θ t ) for all t ∈ T and (θ t θ t ) ∈ t × . As the converse is also true, we have an equivalent formulation of dynamic monotonicity.
Proof of Remark 1. Note that since f is strictly efficient in the range, for each v ∈ co(V (f )) such that v = v f = (v f i ) i∈I , there exists i * ∈ I such that v i * < v f i * . Moreover, since v = f ∈F (f ) α f v f with f ∈F (f ) α f = 1 and α f ≥ 0 for all f ∈ F(f ), it follows from strict efficiency of f and the fact that v f is an extreme point of co(V (f )) that α f = 1 whenever v = v f , i.e., v corresponds to the implementation of f . Consequently, for any deception π such that π t (θ t θ * t ) = θ t = θ * t , v f π ∈ co(V (f )) and v f π = v f . Therefore, for some i * we have v
Proof of Remark 2. Suppose that f is Maskin monotonic and assume that there exists a deception π such that for all t ∈ T , for all θ t ∈ t , for all pairs (θ t θ * t ) with
We need to show that f (θ * t ) = f (θ t ) for all θ t ∈ t , for all t ∈ T . The argument is by induction. Consider the last period T , any θ T , and pairs (θ T θ * T ) with π T (θ T θ * T ) = θ T . Since V i (T ) = {0}, the nestedness of the dynamic lower contour sets, i.e., L
, is equivalent to the nestedness of the static lower contour sets, i.e.,
. From Maskin monotonicity, it follows that f (θ * T ) = f (θ T ), as required. To complete the induction argument, consider period t < T and suppose that for all τ > t, for all θ τ , for all (θ τ θ * τ ) ∈ × , and for all deceptions π such that π τ (θ τ θ * τ ) = θ τ , we
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10 + 5δ 10 + 12δ 10 + 7δ 10 + 11δ . In turn, this is equivalent to the nestedness of the static lower contour sets, i.e., L i (f (θ t ) θ t ) ⊆ L i (f (θ t ) θ * t ). Maskin monotonicity then implies f (θ * t ) = f (θ t ). This concludes the proof.
Proof of Remark 3. Assume to the contrary that f is dynamic monotonic but not weakly efficient in the range; that is, there exists ε > 0 and a payoff profile (v i ) i∈I ∈ co(V (f )) such that v i > v f i + 2ε for all i ∈ I. Using a standard argument about convexifying the set of payoffs without public randomization (e.g., see Lemma 3.7.2 in Mailath and Samuelson 2006) , it follows that there exists δ H 2 such that for all δ ∈ (δ H 2 1) there exists an infinite sequence of social choice functions {f 1 f 2 } with f t ∈ F(f ) for all integers t (i.e., the range of f t is a subset of the range of f ), and (1 − δ) ∞ τ=t δ τ−t v f τ i > v i − ε, for all i ∈ I, for all t. Since f t ∈ F(f ), there exist mappings π t : → such that f • π t = f t . Consider the deception π such that π t (θ t θ * t ) = π t (θ * t ) for all θ * t , for all θ t , for all t. It follows that v + ε for all i. Let ρ = max i∈I θ θ * ∈ |u i (f (θ) θ) − u i (f (θ) θ * )|, and let δ H = max(ρ/(ρ + ε) δ H 2 ). Then, for δ ∈ (δ H 1), for all i, for all pairs (θ t θ * t ) with π t (θ t θ * t ) = θ t , for all θ t ∈ t , for all t ∈ T , it is (1 − δ)u i (f (θ t ) θ * t ) + δv . Dynamic monotonicity then implies that f • π t = f t = f for all t, contradicting the assumed weak inefficiency of f .
Proof of Remark 4. Assume f is Maskin monotonic and efficient in the range, and suppose that there exists a deception π such that for all t ∈ T , for all θ t ∈ t , for all pairs (θ t θ * t ) with π t (θ t θ * t ) = θ t , we have L f i t (f (θ t ) θ t ) ⊆ L f π i θ t (f (θ t ) θ * t ) for all i ∈ I. Recall that v f π i (θ t θ t ) is the (normalized) expected discounted continuation payoff of agent i from following the deception π from the history induced by π and (θ t θ t ). Thus, v f π i (θ t θ t ) is an element of the convex hull of V (f ), the set of payoff profiles of social choice functions with a range contained in the range of f . First, suppose that (v f π i (θ t θ t )) i∈I = (v f i ) i∈I . Since f is efficient in the range, it follows that there exists an agent i * such that v It then immediately follows that the nestedness of the dynamic lower contour sets (i.e., L f i t (f (θ t ) θ t ) ⊆ L f π i θ t (f (θ t ) θ * t )) implies the nestedness of the static lower contour sets (i.e., L i (f (θ t ) θ t ) ⊆ L i (f (θ t ) θ * t )). Maskin monotonicity then implies that f (θ * t ) = f (θ t ). This shows that f (π t (θ t ·)) = f for all θ t ∈ t , for all t ∈ T , and hence f must be dynamic monotonic.
Proof of Remark 6. By contradiction, suppose that f is dynamic monotonic over T periods, but not over T +1 periods. Since f is not dynamic monotonic over T +1 periods, there exist a profile of states θ T +1 ∈ T +1 and a deception π ∈ T +1 with f (π t (θ t θ t )) = 272 Mezzetti and Renou Theoretical Economics 12 (2017) f (θ t ) for at least one t ∈ {1
T + 1}, while the dynamic lower contour sets are nested, i.e., for all i ∈ I, for all t ∈ T , L f i t f π t (θ t θ t ) π t (θ t θ t ) ⊆ L f π i θ t f π t (θ t θ t ) θ t
We first argue that f (π t (θ t θ t )) = f (θ t ) for all t ∈ {2 T + 1}. Fix the first-period state θ 1 in the profile θ T +1 and consider any deception π * * ∈ T such that π * * t (θ t θ t ) = π t+1 ((θ 1 θ t ) θ t ) for all t ∈ {1 T }. In words, π * * mirrors the last T periods of π, given that the first-period state was θ 1 .
By (2) and β t T = β t+1 T +1 , for all i ∈ I and t ∈ {1 T }, L f i t f π * * t (θ t θ t ) π
